



Ethical concern with comics is nothing new; the history of comics is littered with instances of ethical praise or condemnation directed at individual comics or at the art form as a whole. Without doubt the most influential discussion of the ethics of comics is Fredric Wertham's 1954 book Seduction of the Innocent which played a major role in leading to, amongst other things, senate hearings and the formation of the Comics Code Authority (for a history of these events see Nyberg (2005)). Wertham’s primary concern is clearly – as the title of his book indicates – the supposed ill-effects that reading comics has on the moral development of children and adolescents; a concern shared by a number of his contemporaries such as journalist and children’s writer Sterling North (quoted in Duncan, R (2009: 274)).who opines that
the effects of these pulp-paper nightmares is that of a violent stimulant. Their crude blacks and reds spoils a child's natural sense of colour; their hypodermic injection of sex and murder make the child impatient with better, though quieter, stories. Unless we want a coming generation even more ferocious than the present one, parents and teachers throughout America must band together to break the `comic' magazine. 
But Wertham did not shy away from more general criticism, claiming in his published work (1954: 94) that “[t]he world of the comic book is the world of the strong, the ruthless, the bluffer, the shred deceiver, the torturer and the thief” and testifying in senate hearings that “Hitler was a beginner compared to the comic-book industry.” (United States Senate Subcommittee to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency in the United States (quoted in Hajdu 2009: 264).) On the other end of the spectrum, those who have defended the ethical value of comics have also appealed to their effects on children; pointing, for example, to the putative positive effects which emulating the exemplars found in popular comics – Superman, Captain America et al. – can have on their moral development. With a number of educators (such as Mitchell and George 1996) proposing that comics, in particular superhero comics, can play an important positive role in the development of children and young adults. Again, though, such claims are not always restricted to juveniles and some (for example Gerde and Foster 2008) have trumpeted the use of comics as a tool for the ethical education of people of all ages and others (such as Morrison 2011: 416) have lauded their early reading of comics for providing them with “the basis of a code of ethics [they] still live by.”
What are we to make of these disparate claims concerning the links between ethical value (or disvalue) and comics? In this chapter I explore some of claims which have been made concerning the ethical character of comics, and ask whether any of them are worthy of acceptance. In §1 I survey some background issues concerning the ethics of artworks more generally before going on (in § 2) to ask whether there are any ethical issues unique to, or at least uniquely prominent with respect to, comics. Finally, I focus in §3 on some ethical issues concerning the most prominent sub-category within contemporary comics; the superhero genre.

1. The Ethics of Artworks
In order to explore the ethical issues arising from comics it will be useful to first say a little about some of the more general issues that arise in discussion of the relationship between artworks – particularly narrative artworks – and ethics. Recent debates in this area have typically focused on asking whether the moral character of an artwork can be affected by the kinds of representation which that work instantiates and, if so, whether this has any effect on how we ought to evaluate these artwork as artworks (I will focus, as is common in the literature, on discussing putatively immoral artworks). A good place to begin such an enquiry would be by investigating whether there are – adapting some terminology from Eaton (2010: 511-2) – any content restrictions or attitude restrictions on the kinds of representation which an artwork should (morally speaking) instantiate. Restrictions of the first kind concern the things which are represented in a particular work irrespective of the attitude that work prescribes towards them. For example the original version of the Comics Code advocated a total prohibition on the representation of a variety of supernatural creatures, the “the unique details and methods of a crime” and of any form of nudity (Quoted in Adkinson (2008: 246)). The second kind of restriction doesn’t place any limits on what is represented but rather on the way in which it is represented. For example, although the Comics Code allowed the presentation of various sorts of criminal activity it forbade comics from taking a favorable (or even sympathetic) attitude towards such activities and while authority figures could, of course, be represented this could not be done in a manner which rendered them liable to ridicule. Although the authors of the Comics Code – and the earlier Hayes movie code which is the focus of Eaton’s paper – clearly took there to be restrictions of both kinds, the majority of recent discussions concerning ethics and art have focused exclusively on attitude restrictions. Contemporary critics of the ethical value of certain artworks are often keen (likely in part to distances themselves from advocates of the more extreme forms of ethical criticism exemplified by the quotes from North and Wetham above) to make it clear that they are not proposing any moral restrictions on the subject matter of artworks but only on the kind of attitudes which these works can legitimately prescribe.
The contemporary debate with respect to attitude restrictions typically revolves around five central positions; radical moralism, ethicism, moderate autonomism, radical autonomism, and immoralism. According to the radical autonimist “it makes no sense to evaluate works ethically, since works of art cannot possess ethical qualities, either ethical merits or flaws” (Gaut 2007: 67). One might, perhaps, motivate such a position by maintaining that the content represented in artworks is merely fictional, possessing no real existence, and that there are no moral restrictions on the attitudes we may take towards non-existent objects. This claim with respect to the merely fictional is certainly controversial; Gaut (1998: 187-8) ask us to consider the case of someone who spends their leisure time gleefully fantasizing about sexually assaulting merely imaginary women. Even setting this aside, though, this line of argument fails since not all artworks represent merely imagined events (historical and autobiographical comics such as Logicomix and Marjane Satrapi’s Persepolis stand as obvious counterexamples). Other arguments could, of course, be offered for the extreme autonomist view but all of these seem (as Gaut (2007: 67-75) and Carroll (1996: 224-231) illustrate) to be subject to serious criticism. Unsurprisingly, then, this extreme position has rarely been defended in the contemporary literature. Similarly, very writers are attracted to anything like the position of the radical moralist who proposes that all artworks can be legitimately subject to ethical evaluation as well as claiming either that “art should only be discussed from a moral point of view” or else “that moral considerations trump all other considerations” (Carroll 1996: 229).
Rather, the majority of the contemporary debate takes place between those – such as Anderson and Dean (1998) – who advocate moderate autonomism and those – such as Berys Gaut (1998, 2007) – who favor some form of ethicism. (Noël Carroll (1996) defends a distinct position which he calls ‘moderate moralism’. However, since Carroll’s position is similar in spirit to Gaut’s ethicism and it is a point of some contention in exactly what respects they differ, I will treat them as being equivalent in what follows.) Both of these camps accept that the ethical character of a work can be (but need not be) influenced by the kinds of attitude that the work prescribes. For example, while Steve Ditko’s character Mr. A and Alan Moore’s Rorschach (who, of course, bears a number of non-coincidental similarities to Mr. A) both espoused an unflinchingly ‘black and white’ Randian objectivist morality this is presented in an unabashedly positive light in Ditko’s work whereas Moore’s attitude is ambivalent at best. As such – assuming that the majority of us are correct in taking these characters’ attitudes to be morally problematic – both camps would take Ditko’s work to be morally flawed in a way which Moore’s isn’t. The difference between the two views comes when we consider whether this ethical failing has any bearing on the artistic or aesthetic value of the work. The ethicist claims that it does while according to the moderate autonomist it does not. (This claim oversimplifies things a little. For example, Anderson and Dean (1998: 152) allow that “the legitimate aesthetic criticism of a work can surround aspects of the moral subject matter of a work’ but claim that ‘it is never the moral component of the criticism as such that diminishes or strengthens the value of an artwork qua artwork.”) A standard ethicist argument would maintain that Ditko’s work prescribes an attitude – in this case the ethical attitude of moral admiration towards Mr. A’s objectivist worldview – which is not merited and that it is an aesthetic flaw for an artwork to prescribe a response which is not merited (roughly speaking a response is prescribed if it is the response the work is intended to produce in the audience and merited if it is the response which would actually be appropriate). The moderate autonomist, by contrast, would argue that while the works in question can be evaluated in both ethical and aesthetic terms, these kinds of evaluation do not overlap. According to the moderate autonomist our finding Ditko’s work morally problematic but otherwise excellent would be a case where “one’s moral sensibilities and one’s aesthetic are in conflict” rather than one in which “there is a conflict internal to one’s aesthetic dimension” (Anderson and Dean 1998: 166).
Thus far I have neglected the final position in such debates; immoralism. According to the immoralist a moral flaw in an artwork can sometimes be an aesthetic merit. The ‘sometimes’ is important here since immoralists typically allow – in line with the ethicist – that an ethical flaw can be an aesthetic flaw but argue – contra the ethicist – that there can also be instances where moral flaws neither detract from nor fail to affect an artwork’s aesthetic value but rather make it aesthetically better. Why might one think that this is so? One argument for a form of immoralism comes from Eaton (2010: 281) who argues that certain immoral works can instantiate “a peculiar sort of aesthetic achievement” in their “capacity to make an audience feel and desire things inimical to their considered views and deeply held principles.” Consider the character of Light Yagami from the manga serial Death Note. Even someone sympathetic towards Light’s crusade to rid the world of crime – and the extreme methods he employs to further it – should have no problem realizing that Light himself is a morally reprehensible individual. His actions are clearly motivated not merely by a desire for what he perceives as justice but to a large extent by his own egotistical quest for apotheosis, and he is – as with the various ‘rough heroes’ Eaton (Ibid. 284) describes – at the “core a sociopath who displays a pervasive pattern of disregard for the rights and feelings of others.” Portraying Light as a villain for the audience to simply despise would, therefore, require little effort. By contrast seducing the reader – as Death Note frequently does – into “feeling not just fondness, and concern, but also admiration and respect” (Ibid. 285) for a character so morally repellent – while, at the same time, making them fully cognizant of his moral depravity – require a great deal of artistic ingenuity and skill.

Whatever we ultimately conclude with respect to the competing positions surveyed in this section, it is clear – as the examples I have adduced above hopefully illustrated – that the resolution of these broader debates will have an impact on our assessment (ethical and otherwise) of comics. Still, though, these debates are primarily concerned with the ethics of artworks in general rather than of comics in particular. We might reasonably ask, then, whether there any ethical issues unique to (or uniquely prominent with respect to) comics. 

2. Ethical Issues in Comics
It is not obvious how we should begin to answer this question. There are certainly a number of features which might initially seem to separate comics from other art forms. Many comics are mass art – in Noël Carroll’s (1998: 196) sense – that is to say that they are examples of a multiple instance artwork, “are produced and distributed by a mass technology” and are “intentionally designed to gravitate in its structural choices […] toward those choices that promise accessibility with minimum effort, virtually on first contact.” Further, many comics are collaborative artworks rather than the result of a single individual’s artistic vision. Finally, harkening back to the earlier discussion of Wertham and the Comics Code, it is also true that many comics are intended (whether overtly or not) to be appealing to children and young adults. And there are already extant arguments for the moral relevance of each of these features (for discussion see Carroll (1998: 291-359), Pratt (2009: 100-101), and Hajdu (2009) respectively). Whatever we make of these arguments, though, they don’t tell us anything concerning comics in particular. These features are neither unique to comics nor characteristic of all comics. Videogames, TV dramas, and Mills and Boon novels are all examples of mass art, the vast majority of films are collaborative artworks, and there are any number of artworks aimed at children and young adults. On the other end of the scale, there are clearly comics – such as the site-specific comics of Ozge Samanci – which are not mass artworks, as well as various ‘indie’ comics which are the product of a single author, and comics – such as those produced by Marvel’s MAX and DC’s Vertigo imprints – which are explicitly marketed as unsuitable for younger readers (though see Pratt (2009: 101-102) for reasons to think that this marketing is at least somewhat disingenuous).
Another line of enquiry might proceed – as much of the ethical criticism of comics found in the popular media has – by proposing a causal link between comic consumption – or, at least, the consumption of comics depicting extreme violence and other undesirable phenomena – and a propensity towards various unethical acts. Indeed, Wertham himself conducted a number of studies in this vein in order to lend support to the various accusations which he levelled against comic books. However, these particular studies have been long since discredited. Hajdu (2009: 99-102), for example, points out that the empirical evidence Wertham presents leans more towards the anecdotal than the statistical and that he ignores (or, at least, downplays) other factors – such as the low socio-economic status and social marginalization of his subjects – which may also have contributed to a higher incidence of delinquent behavior. This does not mean, though, that such a link does not exist. Indeed, some recent empirical work strongly indicates a link between reading violent comic books and exhibiting various undesirable features. Steven Kirsh and Paul Olczak (2000, 2002a and 2002b), for example, have conducted a series of experiments which show that undergraduate students who read extremely violent comics are more likely to interpret ambiguous actions negatively, to recommend retaliation against perceived slights, and to demonstrate an increased level of hostility. It is, however, not clear that this tells us anything concerning the ethical value of comics as such. In all these cases Kirsch and Olczak were contrasting the effects of reading extremely violent comics not with the effects of refraining from reading comics but, rather, with the effects of reading other (less violent) comics. Further, as they themselves highlight (2000: 47), very similar effects have been found with respect to violence in other media (including non-fictional news reporting). 
Indeed, there is extremely good reason to be skeptical of the claim that there is any substantive ethical issue unique to comics since this would appear to require there to be some morally relevant feature possessed by all and only comics. Or, at least, some feature which while not present in all comics – nor absent in all non-comics – is standard in Kendall Walton’s (1970: 339) sense for comics (that is a feature the lack of which would tend to disqualify something from being a comic) but non-standard for other art forms. Any such feature would have to be one which arise with respect to (or standardly arises with respect to) such diverse items as Lee and Kirby’s Fantastic Four, George Herriman’ Krazy Kat series, Tijuana bibles, Fumetti, the instructional safety comics found in most commercial airplanes, and – if we accept Scott McCloud’s (1994: 9) influential definition of comics – the Bayeux Tapestry and Hogarth’s Rake’s Progress but which is absent from (or not standardly present in) any other art form. In my view the most developed attempt to discover such a feature is found in Henry Pratt’s recent paper ‘Medium Specificity and the Ethics of Narrative in Comics’. Pratt (2009: 98) asks whether (in parallel to the discussion of the ethics of artworks in §1 above) there could be cases where some attitude or response is prescribed not by an individual artwork but by an artistic medium – in this case the medium of the comic – itself. Although Pratt himself ultimately appears to answer this question in the negative he suggests a number of interesting candidate cases. Along with worries concerning the nature and production of comics – such as those concerning the mass art nature of comics, their multiple authorship, and their tendency to be marketed at children discussed above – Pratt also considers some possible moral objections to their content. He points out, for example, (ibid., 108-9) that many comic historians “locate the historical origins of comics in caricature” and that this “proclivity for caricature in comics has persisted.” Some might reasonably be concerned, then, that this tendency toward caricature in comics will have a number of ethically problematic consequences such as encouraging and reinforcing various undesirable stereotypes. Yet, even if we grant the dubious assumption that comics as a medium (rather than merely certain genres of comic) have this kind of tendency, this line of reasoning still seems problematic. As Pratt himself points out (Ibid., 109) while caricature may be used to foster morally reprehensible ends there is no reason to think that caricature in itself is morally problematic. Especially since there are extant cases where caricature has clearly been used for morally laudable purposes (Pratt (Ibid.) discusses the example of Kelly’s comic strip Pogo and its criticism of McCarthyism). And, of course, comics are not the only art form which could be accused of having this tendency towards caricature; animated cartoons, puppet shows and mime all appear open to the same charge.

3. The Ethics of Superheroes
So far we have investigated the possibility of ethical issues concerning artworks in general and those concerning comics in particular. In this section I will narrow focus even further to ask about the ethical significance of one particular kind of comic; the superhero genre. The predominance of the superhero genre within comics is certainly a noteworthy feature. The majority of comics produced in the English speaking world belong to this single genre and for the average person on the street talk of ‘comics’ is likely to conjure up images of fantastical heroes in spandex. There are, of course, a number of candidate explanations for the peculiar success of this single genre some of which place significant weight on ethical factors. Tom and Matt Morris (2005: x-xi), for example, claim that 
[t]he best superhero comics, in addition to being tremendously entertaining, introduce and treat in vivid ways some of the most interesting and important questions facing all human beings–questions regarding ethics, personal and social responsibility, justice, crime and punishment […] what love really means, the nature of a family, the classic virtues like courage, and many other important issues.
 But are there really any ethical issues specific to superhero comics? For reasons paralleling those offered in the last section, I think it extremely unlikely that we will discover any significant ethical feature present in all and only superhero comics. Instead, I want to suggest a different approach which may prove more fruitful. 
In a recent paper Roy T. Cook (2012) has addressed an interesting challenge to the interest of the theoretical study of comics, according to which comics are “little more than static films on paper” (Ibid. 165). As such, one might think, comics studies can merely appropriate wholesale the results of work already conducted in the significantly more developed field of film studies. There are, of course, a number of reasons to be doubtful of this claim – indeed, as Cook (ibid.) makes clear the original charge was presented in a somewhat light-hearted manner – but Cook highlights a particularly interesting line of response relating to the medium-specific conventions found in comics. Cook argues that comics have their own conventions – he focuses primarily on formal convention such as the use of thought bubbles, and ‘gutters’ between panels – not present in films which can prove both aesthetically relevant and theoretically fruitful (as Cook (Ibid. 182) points out thought bubbles and the like can, of course, be used in films but the crucial point is that no established convention of using such devices exists within films). Could something similar be said with respect to the ethics of superhero comics? That is, are any of the conventions found within such comics ethically relevant?
In The Myth of the Superhero Marco Arnaudo (2013: 71-4) surveys (without endorsing) a number of reasons based on the conventions – in this case narrative rather than formal – of the superhero genre for regarding it as morally problematic. One worry is that superheroes are too conservative in their actions; they seek to defend, rather than improve, the status quo. Relatedly there is the commonly expressed worry that superheroes typically target low level street crime rather than taking steps to address the wider social issues which contribute to crime and urban deprivation. In those rare cases where superheroes do attempt to bring about broader change this is typically presented as either futile (even for Superman as seen in the graphic novel Peace on Earth) morally ambiguous (as in Warren Ellis and Bryan Hitch’s The Authority) or downright villainous (in the case of the Justice League of America foes the Justice Lords). Arnaudo also considers ethical worries in the opposite direction, claiming that the modus operandi of superheroes tends to subvert, rather than to reinforce, important social values. In particular there is the concern (reflected in some of the articles of the comics code) that the superhero is typically a vigilante who “Places themselves above the law and resolves conflicts with violence” (Ibid. 71). Of course none of these claims apply to all superhero comics. Batman and Superman are frequently shown fighting broader social ills in their alter-egos as Bruce Wayne and Clark Kent, and a number of superhero teams – such as The Avengers and the Justice League – frequently operate with some kind of officially recognized status. The point remains, though, that while these are not exceptionless generalities they are still manifestly the conventions of the genre.
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